This paper examines the incentives that generation firms have in restructured electricity markets for supporting long-term transmission investments. In particular, we study whether generation firms, which arguably play a dominant role in the restructured electricity markets, have the incentives to fund or support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission investments.
Introduction
There is growing evidence that the U.S. transmission system is under stress (Abraham, 2002) .
Growth of electricity demand and new generation capacity, lack of investment in new transmission facilities, and the incomplete transition to efficient and competitive wholesale markets have allowed transmission bottlenecks to emerge. These bottlenecks increase consumer costs and reliability problems. That is, the increased use of the transmission grid has led to transmission congestion and less operating flexibility to respond to system problems or component failures.
This lack of flexibility has increased the risk of power failures and blackouts. From an economic perspective, increased congestion reduces the ability to import power from remote cheap generators, thus raising the cost of energy. It also impedes trade and competition, which in turn makes consumers more vulnerable to the exercise of market power.
The so-called Standard Market Design (FERC, 2002) , which prevails (or is in the process of being implemented) in the restructured electricity markets in the US, relies on locational marginal prices for energy to price and manage congestion and to signal the need for economically driven transmission investments 1 . Studies addressing the insufficiency of incentives for investment in the U.S. electricity transmission system are sparse. Moreover, none of the incentive structures proposed in the literature have been broadly adopted. Bushnell and Stoft (1996) apply the definition of financial transmission rights (rights that entitle holders to receive financial benefits derived from the use of the capacity) in the context of nodal pricing systems. They suggest a transmission rights allocation rule based on the concept of feasible dispatch, and prove that such a rule can reduce or, under ideal circumstances, eliminate the incentives for a detrimental grid expansion while rewarding efficient investments.
1 While locational marginal prices provide the right incentives for generation firms to operate efficiently, investments in transmission systems are generally driven by either reliability motives or by the search for a satisfactory rate of return (merchant investment). Most of the transmission investments in the US are driven by reliability considerations while the economic analysis serves for impact assessment and cost allocation.
adequately account for the stochastic and dynamic physical attributes of transmission networks.
Thus, they argue that property rights that are "contingent" on exogenous variations in transmission capacity and reflect the diversification attributes of new investments would be required.
Unfortunately, defining and allocating these contingent rights is also likely to be inconsistent with the development of liquid competitive markets for these rights or derivatives on them.
In addition, Joskow and Tirole (2003) argue that the difficulty of "correctly" assigning financial transmission property rights is another deterrent to invest in the transmission system.
Under the Bushnell-and-Stoft's framework, the allocation of transmission property rights is made by an independent system operator (ISO) who looks for feasibility of the network using a sequence of simulations of the system. However, these types of assignments may be subjective, especially in the case of allocating incremental network investments (investments that involve upgrades of existing facilities).
The difficulty of correctly assigning financial transmission property rights is also addressed in Barmack et al. (2003) . Differently from Joskow and Tirole (2003) , they mention two other important reasons for the inefficiency of financial property rights with respect to incentives for transmission investment: (i) a transmission investment that eliminates congestion results in financial property rights that are worthless, and (ii) it may be difficult for transmission owners (TOs) to capture other benefit streams resulting from transmission investment. Joskow and Tirole (2000) analyze how the allocation of transmission rights associated with the use of power networks affects the operational behavior of generation firms and consumers with market power. Their analysis, as well as the analysis in (Joskow and Tirole, 2003) , focuses on an always-congested two-node network where there is a cheap generation monopolist in an exporting region that has no local demand and an expensive generation monopolist in an importing region that contains the entire-system demand. They conclude that if the generation firm in the importing region has market power, their holding financial transmission rights enhances that market power.
In section 3.2 of this paper, we analyze the consequences of this finding on the incentives that generation firms have to support social-welfare-improving transmission expansions.
Several related studies try to improve the incentive structures for transmission investment by dealing with the generator's motivation to exercise market power. In (Cardell et al., 1997) , (Joskow and Tirole, 2000) , (Oren, 1997) , and (Stoft, 1999) , the authors study the implications of the exercise of market power in congested two-and/or three-node networks where the entire system demand is concentrated in only one node. The main idea behind these papers is that if an expensive generator with local market power is required to produce power as a result of network congestion, then the generation firm owning this generator may have a disincentive to relieve congestion. Borenstein et al. (2000) present an analysis of the relationship between transmission capacity and generation competition in the context of a two-node network in which there is local demand at each node. The authors argue that relatively small transmission investment may yield large payoffs in terms of increased competition. However, they only consider the case in which generation firms cannot hold transmission rights. In section 3.2 of this article, we extend this analysis to allow both local demand at each node of the network and the possibility that generation firms hold financial transmission rights.
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) has recently developed a "Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology" (TEAM) for assessing transmission expansion projects, which is based on the gains from trade principle (Sheffrin, 2005) , (CAISO, 2004) . Although TEAM considers alternative generation-expansion scenarios with and without transmission upgrades, as far as we know, this generation-expansion analysis does not take into account the potential strategic response to transmission investment from generation firms who may alter their investment plans in new generation capacity. This rationale underlines common wisdom that prevailed in a regulated environment justifying the construction of transmission between cheap and expensive generation nodes on the grounds of reducing energy cost to consumers. However, as shown by Sauma and Oren (2006) , such rationale may no longer hold in a market-based environment where market power is present.
On the other hand, FERC has recently proposed transmission pricing reforms designed to promote needed investment in energy infrastructure (FERC, 2005) . Basically, FERC proposes an increase in the rate of return on equity, especially for stand-alone transmission companies (Transcos), in order to both attract new investment in transmission facilities and encourage formation of Transcos. This FERC proposal is based on the idea that incentives may be more effective in fostering new transmission investment for Transcos than for traditional public utilities that are dependent upon retail regulators for some portion of their transmission cost recovery.
In this paper, we focus on the incentives that generation firms at generation pockets have to support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansions and how these incentives are affected by the ownership of financial transmission rights (FTRs). We are interested in analyzing the effect of local market power on such incentives when considering both that generation firms can hold FTRs and that generation firms cannot hold FTRs. For simplicity, we will assume through this article that transmission line capacities are static and deterministic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the distributional impacts of transmission investments. In section 3, we explore how FTRs allocation may be used to both align the incentives for transmission expansion of the different market participants and mitigate conflicts of interest when such expansions are social-welfare improving, in the context of a twonode network. We illustrate the theoretical results obtained in section 3 through a numerical example presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Distributional Impacts of Transmission Investments
Before analyzing the transmission investment incentives of generation firms, it is worth to emphasize the well-known fact that transmission expansions generally have distributional impacts, which could potentially create conflicts of interests among the affected parties. The key issue is that, while society as a whole may benefit from incremental mitigation of congestion, some parties may be adversely affected.
In general, transmission investment effects rent transfers from load pocket generators and generation pocket consumers to load pocket consumers and generation pocket generators.
However, load pocket consumers and generation pocket generators cannot simply decide to build a line linking them. Their decision will be subject to scrutiny by not only an ISO, but also state and federal energy and environmental regulators. In this type of environment, the "losers" from transmission investment can be expected to expend up to the amount of rents that they stand to lose to block the transmission investment. This rent dissipation is wasteful. Moreover, it may block socially-beneficial projects from being built. The following examples illustrate the distributional impacts of transmission investments and the potential incentives that some market participants can have to exercise political power in order to block a social-welfare-improving transmission expansion project.
Consider a network composed of two cities satisfying their electricity demand with local generation firms. For simplicity, assume there exists only one (monopolist) generation firm in each city, which have unlimited generation capacity. We assume that the marginal cost of supply at city 1 is lower than that at city 2. In particular, suppose the marginal costs of generation are constant 3 and equal to zero at city 1 and $20/MWh at city 2. Assume the inverse demand functions are linear, given by P 1 (q) = 100 -0.1⋅q at city 1 and by P 2 (q) = 120 -0.2⋅q at city 2, in $/MWh.
Under the monopolistic (self-sufficient-cities) scenario, the city 1 firm optimally produces 
, where Q = q 1 + q 2 .
We assume that generation firms behave as Cournot oligopolists in this case. In this example, by linking both cities with a high-capacity transmission line, we replace some expensive power produced at city 2 by cheaper power generated at city 1, which makes city 2 consumers clearly better off. Unfortunately, this is not the only implication of the construction of such a transmission line. The city 2 firm reduces its profit because its retail price decreases as result of the competition between generation firms introduced by the new transmission line. 4 Under monopoly, a firm optimally chooses a quantity such that the marginal cost of supply equals its marginal revenue. If the marginal cost of production is constant and equal to c and the demand is linear, given by P(q) = a -b⋅q, where a > c, then the monopolist will optimally produce q (M) = (a-c)/(2b) and charge a price P Indeed, the numerical results reveals that the construction of the transmission line has the following consequences: the city 1-consumers' surplus increases from $12,500/h to $16,691/h, the city 2-consumers' surplus increases from $6,250/h to $15,124/h, the city 1-firm's profit increases from $25,000/h to $26,741/h, and the city 2-firm's profit decreases from $12,500/h to $7,407/h.
From these results, it is clear that the city 2 firm (load pocket generator) will oppose the construction of the line linking both cities because this line will decrease its profit, transferring its rents to the other market participants. Consequently, depending on the relative political power of the city 2 firm, this network-expansion project could be blocked, even though it could be socially beneficial (depending on the transmission investment costs) 6 .
The problem of rent transfer may arise even in the absence of market power. To illustrate this fact, assume that city 1 (generation pocket) has 1,000 MW of local generation capacity at benefit from such an expansion is, therefore, $4,000/h. Assuming that the amortized upgrade costs is below $4,000/h, the upgrade is socially beneficial. The market consequences of such an upgrade are that the market clearing price at city 1 increases from $10/MWh to $20/MWh while the market clearing price at city 2 stays $30/MWh as before, with 600 MW being exported from city 1 to city 2. Thus, consumers and generators in city 2 are neutral to the expansion, consumer surplus in city 1 will drop by $6,000/h, generator's profits in city 1 will increase by $10,000/h, and the merchandising surplus of the system operator will remain unchanged (the ISO merchandising surplus on the pre-expansion imports drops $3,000/h, but it picks up $3,000/h for the incremental imports). Clearly, such an expansion is likely to face stiff opposition from consumers in city 1, but it would be strongly favored by the generators at city 1, who would be more than happy to pay for it (as long as the amortized investment cost does not exceed $10,000/h). In fact, generators at node 1 would favor such an investment even if its amortized cost exceed the $4,000/h benefits, which would make such an investment socially inefficient to the detriment of city 1 consumers.
By contrast to the above example, a small incremental upgrade of 90 MW in the transmission capacity would be socially beneficial increasing social surplus by $1,800/h without affecting the market clearing prices in either city. In such a case, neither the generators nor the consumers on either side will benefit (or be harmed) by the expansion and, thus, the entire gain will go to the ISO in the form of merchandising surplus. In such a case, a merchant transmission owner could be induced to undertake the transmission upgrade in exchange for financial transmission rights (FTRs) that would entitle her to the locational marginal price differences for the incremental capacity, thus allowing the investor to capture the entire social surplus gain due to the expansion.
In the following section, we will further explore how FTR allocation may be used to both align the incentives for transmission expansion of the different market participants and mitigate conflicts of interest when such expansions are socially beneficial.
Transmission Investment Incentives of Generation Firms
In analyzing the transmission investment incentives of generation firms, considering the implications of the exercise of local market power by generators becomes crucial. Here, we study this idea in the context of a radial, two-node network and explore how the investment incentives are affected by the ownership of financial transmission rights (FTRs) by generation firms. The analysis in this section shows both that a socially-concerned regulator should restrict the ownership of FTRs by the net importer generation firm because that may produce a disincentive to support incremental transmission expansions that increase both consumer surplus and social welfare. Furthermore, the net exporter generation firm has the correct incentives to increase the transmission capacity up to certain level. We also show that, if all FTRs were allocated or auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm, then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral.
As general framework for the analysis presented in this section, we assume that the transmission system uses locational marginal pricing, generation firms behave as Cournot oligopolists, transmission losses are negligible, all transmission rights are financial rights (whose holders are rewarded based on congestion rents), and network investors are rewarded based on a regulated rate of return administered by a non-profit ISO, which manages transmission assets owned by many investors. The main two reasons for this choice are: (i) many of the U.S.
transmission systems actually use this type of scheme and (ii) this structure has been proposed by
FERC as part of its Standard Market Design (FERC, 2002).
We also assume that each market participant must trade power with an ISO, at the nodal price of its local node. Thus, the generation firm located at node i will receive a payment equal to the nodal price at node i times the quantity produced and the consumers at node j will pay an amount equal to the nodal price at node j times the quantity consumed.
Consider a network composed of two nodes linked by a transmission line of thermal capacity K. The non-depreciated capital and operating costs of the link are assumed to be recovered separately from consumers (for instance, in lump-sum charges net of revenues produced by selling transmission rights) and we do not consider these costs further in our analysis.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one generation firm at each node, having unlimited generation capacity. We assume that the production cost functions of the two firms, say C 1 (q) and C 2 (q), are convex and twice differentiable in the firms' outputs (i.e., the firms' marginal costs of generation are continuously non-decreasing in the firms' outputs). We also assume that the inverse demand function at each node of the network, say P 1 (q) at node 1 and P 2 (q) at node 2, is continuous and downward sloping. Moreover, we suppose that, if the two markets were completely isolated (i.e., no connected by any transmission line), the generation firms would produce outputs q 1 M and q 2 M such that
Let q i (i = 1,2) be the quantity of energy produced by the generation firm located at node i, and let q t be the net quantity exported from node 1 to node 2. This quantity (q t ) depends on both nodal prices and, thus, depends on both q 1 and q 2 . Moreover, q t must satisfy the transmission capacity constraints (i.e., it must satisfy -K ≤ q t ≤ K, where a negative q t represents a net flow from node 2 to node 1).
Our analysis considers two scenarios: first, a scenario in which generation firms cannot hold transmission rights and second, a scenario in which generation firms can hold FTRs.
Scenario I: generation firms cannot hold transmission rights
Assume generation firms cannot hold transmission rights (and, thus, their bidding strategy is independent of the congestion rent). Accordingly, in this case, the profit of the generation firm located at node 1 (cheapgen) is π 1 (q 1 ) = q 1 ⋅P 1 (q 1 -q t ) -C 1 (q 1 ) and the profit of the generation firm
When generation firms cannot hold transmission rights, it is relatively simple to analyze the incentives that generation firms with local market power have to support social-welfare-improving 7 This would be the case if, for example, both generation firms faced equal demand curves (i.e., P 1 (q) = P 2 (q)) and the marginal cost of supply at node 1 were lower than that at node 2 over the relevant range (i.e.,
transmission investments. We could argue that, by congesting the system, 8 generation firms have the ability to exercise their local market power and deliberately withhold their outputs so that they can increase their profits. However, we must be cautious in the analysis of the equilibrium conditions because nodal prices, P 1 (q 1 -q t ) and P 2 (q 2 + q t ) in our example, are discontinuous at the point where the transmission line becomes congested (i.e., at q t = ± K).
In (Borenstein et al., 2000) , the authors use a two-node network similar to the one described above. They showed that, as the thermal capacity of the transmission line, K, increases from zero, one of two possible outcomes is obtained:
passive/aggressive (P/A) Nash equilibrium exists
Case 2: K* < K < K' both P/A and unconstrained Cournot Nash equilibria exists
where K' corresponds to the largest line capacity that can support a P/A Nash equilibrium (i.e., a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the transmission line is congested with net flow from the lower-price -under monopoly -market to the higher-price market) and K* represents the smallest transmission line capacity that can support an unconstrained 10 Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium (i.e., a Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium in which K is high enough so that the line is never congested). 8 In this article, the term "congestion" is used in the electrical engineering sense: a line is congested when the flow of power is equal to the line's thermal capacity, as determined by various engineering standards. 9 See Theorem 5 in (Borenstein et al., 2000) . 10 In this paper, the term "unconstrained" refers to the fact that the transmission constraint is not binding.
previous cases. Figure 1 , reproduced from (Borenstein et al., 2000) , illustrates the best-response functions in case 2 (i.e., the overlapping equilibria case). Accordingly, if the transmission line capacity is high enough (i.e., K > Max{K', K*}), then an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium exists and it corresponds to the unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium. In this case, there is no congestion at the Nash equilibrium and q t is far enough from ± K so that both P 1 (q 1 -q t ) and P 2 (q 2 + q t ) are continuous and differentiable over the relevant range. Thus, the unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium (in which each firm maximizes its profit taking the output of the other firm as fixed subject to the fact that nodal prices must be equal at both nodes) is characterized by the following system of equations (first order optimality conditions):
These optimality conditions are only valid under the assumption that, at the equilibrium, q t is far enough from ± K. The only way to guarantee this fact is by ensuring that the transmission line capacity is high enough so that the line is never congested. However, this is not an interesting case to analyze from the point of view of the transmission investment incentives because generation firms have obviously no incentives to support an increment in the capacity of a line that has large excess capacity.
On the other hand, if the transmission line capacity is low enough (i.e., K < Min{K', K*}), then generation firms act according to a Nash equilibrium in which the transmission line is congested with net flow from the lower-price (under monopoly) market to the higher-price market (i.e., a P/A Nash equilibrium). In this case, q t = K (i.e., the line is congested with net flow from node 1 to node 2) and the discontinuity of both P 1 (q 1 -q t ) and P 2 (q 2 +q t ) at the point where the line is congested becomes problematic (i.e., as q t approach to K,
are not well defined).
Consider a P/A point of operation, (q 1 c , q 2 c ), that maximizes the firms' profits given that the quantity exported from node 1 to node 2 is fixed and equal to the line capacity (i.e., subject to the fact that the line is congested with flow from node 1 to node 2). That is, q 1 c is the profitmaximizing output of the cheapgen when it faces an inverse demand curve given by
which is the cheapgen's native inverse demand shifted rightward by K, and q 2 c is the output of the deargen when it maximizes its profit given the residual inverse demand it faces, P 2 (q 2 + K), which is the deargen's native inverse demand shifted leftward by K. In this case, the cheapgen effectively acts as a monopolist on the rightward-shifted inverse demand curve and the deargen effectively acts as a monopolist on its residual inverse demand curve. Borenstein et al. (2000) show that, for sufficiently small transmission capacity, the quantities (q 1 c , q 2 c ) are the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
11 Although the proof presented in (Borenstein et al., 2000) correctly analyzes the incentives that the generation firms have to not deviate from the equilibrium, the fact that both P 1 (q 1 -q t ) and P 2 (q 2 +q t ) are discontinuous at the point where the line is congested and the associated complexities are not explicitly addressed in the proof. In (Sauma, 2005) , an alternative proof is provided showing that (q 1 c , q 2 c ) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, that accounts for all possible discontinuities. We omit the detailed proof due to space limitation and summarize in Table 1 below the basic rationale. 11 See Theorem 4 in (Borenstein et al., 2000) . Now, we analyze the incentives/disincentives that the generation firms have to support an increase in the capacity of the transmission line while the Nash equilibrium characterized by (q 1 c , q 2 c ) prevails. Here, we will assume that such an increase in the transmission capacity is desired because it would increase both the total consumer surplus and the social welfare, as it is more likely to happen in a congested radial network according to the gains from trade economic principle (Sheffrin, 2005) .
Suppose the thermal capacity of the transmission line is increased by a small positive amount, ΔK, such that the P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. Then, the cheapgen will act as a monopolist on the (K+ΔK)-rightward-shifted inverse demand curve and, consequently, it will reoptimize its profit by increasing its output so that q t is augmented by ΔK (i.e., congest the line again). Accordingly, the cheapgen's new optimal output, q 1 c (K+ΔK)
, will be larger than q 1 c and the new optimal price at node 1, P 1 (q 1 c (K+ΔK) -(K+ΔK)), will be greater or equal to that before the expansion (because the consumption at node 1 must either decrease or remain equal at the new optimum). 12 Therefore, the cheapgen will definitely have positive incentives to support this transmission expansion because it increases the cheapgen's profit. Proposition 1: Assume that generation firms cannot hold transmission rights. In the two-node network described in this section, the net exporter generation firm (i.e., the cheapgen) has positive indifferent and node 2 consumers better off), obtaining an extra profit equal to ΔK⋅P 1 (q 1 c -K). However, the fact that the cheapgen now faces a higher demand motivates it to exercise its local market power, reducing its output from the theoretical q 1 c + ΔK (while, of course, still resulting in an output greater than q 1 c ) in order to increase the price at node 1 and, thus, increase its profit. That is, the cheapgen will now act as a monopolist on the (K+ΔK)-rightward-shifted inverse demand curve and reoptimize its profit by increasing its output in such a way so that the line is congested and the profit gained due to the nodal price increase, q 1 c(K+ΔK)
, is larger than the profit "lost" due to the fact that the output is increased by less Figure 2 illustrates these facts.
incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported.
Proof. Assume that the Nash equilibrium characterized by (q 1 c , q 2 c ), with q 1 c > 0 and q 2 c > 0, is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. Since generation firms cannot hold transmission rights, the profit of the cheapgen at the equilibrium is:
By using the envelope theorem, we obtain:
Since q 1 c > 0 and the inverse demand functions are continuous and downward sloping (i.e.,
. This is, the equilibrium cheapgen's profit increases as the transmission capacity increases, as long as a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. Consequently, the cheapgen has positive incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. ■ On the other hand, when the line capacity is increased by the small positive amount, ΔK, the deargen's best response is to produce its optimal "passive" output. That is, the deargen will act as a monopolist on its residual, (K+ΔK)-leftward-shifted, inverse demand curve and reoptimize its profit by decreasing its output. The new optimal output, q 2 c(K+ΔK)
, will be smaller than q 2 c and the new optimal price at node 2, P 2 (q 2 c (K+ΔK) + (K+ΔK)), will be smaller or equal to that before the expansion (because the consumption at node 2 must either increase or remain equal at the new optimum). 13 Therefore, the deargen will have disincentives to support this transmission expansion 13 If the deargen kept its output at the q 2 c level even after increasing the thermal capacity of the line by ΔK, the price at node 2 would decrease from P 2 (q 2 c +K) to P 2 (q 2 c +K+ΔK), producing a lost in the deargen profit (with respect to the pre-expansion situation) equal to Proposition 2: Assume that generation firms cannot hold transmission rights. In the two-node network described in this section, the net importer generation firm (i.e., the deargen) has disincentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level such that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported.
P 2 (q 2 c +K+ΔK)). However, the deargen could exercise its local market power and reduce its output in order to increase the price at node 2 with respect to the theoretical price P 2 (q 2 c +K+ΔK) and, thus, increase its profit with respect to the situation in which the deargen keeps the output at the q 2 c level. That is, the deargen will now act as a monopolist on the (K+ΔK)-leftward-shifted inverse demand curve and reoptimize its profit by reducing its output in such a way so that the line is congested and the "gain" in profit, By using the envelope theorem, we obtain:
Since q 2 c > 0 and the inverse demand functions are continuous and downward sloping (i.e., P 2 '(q 2 c + K) < 0), we have from (7) that: ( )
. This is, the equilibrium deargen's profit decreases as the transmission capacity increases, as long as a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. Consequently, the deargen has disincentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level such that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. ■ Summarizing, when the equilibrium characterized by (q 1 c , q 2 c ) is accomplished, the cheapgen has incentives to support an increase in the capacity of the transmission line by some small positive amount (such that the P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported) while the deargen has disincentives to support such a transmission expansion. However, this analysis is only valid for small incremental expansions of the line. As the size of the line upgrade increases, the P/A Nash equilibrium may no longer be supported (i.e., the best response of the deargen could be to increase significantly its output so that it either decongests the line or congests the line with net flow in the opposite direction). If this occurred, then it is unclear whether the cheapgen would still have incentives to support the expansion of the transmission line. In fact, if the network upgrade were large enough so that it led to an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium, then such an investment would likely reduce the profits of both generators. 14 All these results are illustrated through a simple numerical example, presented in section 4.1, where demand functions are linear and generation firms have constant marginal costs.
A remaining question in our analysis is what happens with the generation firms' incentives to support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansions when the line capacity is neither too small nor too high (i.e., when K is such that Min{K',K*} < K < Max{K',K*}). Such analysis is complex because the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in this case. Although we leave this analysis as future work, our intuition is that, even under mixedstrategy Nash-Cournot equilibria, expected nodal prices will decline as the line capacity increases.
With a very small transmission capacity, for instance, nodal prices should be very close to the monopoly levels. If they were not, then either firm could improve its expected profit by simply admitting imports of K and producing the optimal passive output as a pure strategy. With K near K*, the lower bounds on prices provided by the optimal passive output responses should be much weaker and the mixed strategy would be more likely to result in lower expected prices.
Scenario II: generation firms can hold FTRs
Assume now that generation firms can hold some FTRs. In particular, suppose that the cheapgen and the deargen hold fractions α and (1 -α) of the K FTRs available from node 1 to node 2 (α ∈ [0,1]), respectively. Thus, in our two-node network, the cheapgen now maximizes the following profit function (making rational expectations of the deargen's outcome):
Likewise, the deargen now maximizes the following profit function (making rational expectations of the cheapgen's outcome):
equilibrium from a P/A Nash equilibrium to an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium reduces the profits of both generators because nodal prices "discontinuously jump down" (although firms' outputs increase).
Generation firms must acquire their FTRs through some type of allocation scheme or auction.
In this section, we assume that FTRs are allocated free of charge directly to the market participants.
15
If the transmission line capacity were high enough (i.e., K > Max{K', K*}) 16 so that an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium would exist (and it would correspond to the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium), then there would be no congestion at the equilibrium.
This means that the nodal prices at both ends of the uncongested line would be equal.
Accordingly, all FTRs would become worthless due to the zero nodal price difference.
Consequently, when the transmission line capacity is high enough, so that there is no congestion at the Nash equilibrium, the fact that generation firms can hold FTRs does not make any difference in profits as compared to the benchmark case (without FTRs). Thus, in this case, the unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium is characterized by the same system of equations (first order optimality conditions) as in the benchmark case, i.e. equations (1) On the other hand, if the transmission line capacity were low enough (i.e., K < Min{K', K*}) so that a P/A Nash equilibrium were supported, then the transmission line would be congested with net flow from node 1 to node 2 (i.e., q t = K) at the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
17
15 In some areas, FTRs are auctioned off among the market participants and, then, the revenues collected from the auction process are allocated to the load on a prorate basis. In contrast, in some other areas, FTRs are allocated directly free of charge to the market participants (on the basis of claims). This last scheme is the one assumed in this article. 16 Here, we maintain the same notation as in the case without FTRs. That is, K' corresponds to the largest line capacity that can support a P/A Nash equilibrium and K* represents the smallest line capacity that can support an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium. 17 The proof that the outcome (q 1 c (α), q 2 c (α)), which maximizes the generation firms' profits given both that the line is congested with flow from node 1 to node 2 and that α has a fixed value, is a Nash equilibrium is analogous to the case without FTRs.
In this case, we can analyze the incentives/disincentives that the generation firms have to support an increase in the capacity of the transmission line, while a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported, in a similar way as in the benchmark case (without FTRs).
When the P/A Nash equilibrium is supported, the cheapgen maximizes its profit as if it had monopoly power over its K-rightward-shifted inverse demand function, but having two revenues streams now: a first stream of revenue from sales of energy and a second stream of revenues from the congestion rents from the FTRs. Consequently, while the P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the cheapgen effectively increases the price elasticity of its residual demand curve by holding FTRs.
18
Proposition 3 establishes the same result as in proposition 1 in the case that generation firms can hold FTRs. This is, in the two-node network described in this section, the cheapgen has positive incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported.
Proposition 3:
In the two-node network described in this section, the net exporter generation firm (i.e., the cheapgen) has positive incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported.
Proof. When assuming that generation firms cannot hold transmission rights, the proof is identical to the proof of proposition 1. Now, assume generation firms can hold FTRs. Suppose that the cheapgen and the deargen hold fractions α and (1 -α) of the K FTRs available from node 1 to node 2 (α ∈ [0,1]), respectively.
Assume that a Nash equilibrium characterized by (q 1 c (α),q 2 c (α)), with q 1 c (α)>0 and q 2 c (α)>0,
is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. The profit of the cheapgen at the equilibrium is:
18 When holding FTRs, the cheapgen has incentive to increase its output and, thus, decrease its nodal price with respect to the benchmark-case levels. This is translated into an incentive to increase the elasticity of demand, ε(q) , because P'(q) q p q p dp
where P'(q) < 0.
or equivalently:
where
Since q 1 c (α) > 0 and the inverse demand functions are continuous and downward sloping (i.e.,
, the first term of the right-hand side of (11) is positive. The second term must be also positive, even though 1 P > P 1 (q 1 c (α)-K) and 2 P < P 2 (q 2 c (α)+K), because 2 P > 1 P must hold in order to still support a P/A Nash equilibrium. Consequently, from (11), we get that:
> 0. This is, the equilibrium cheapgen's profit increases as the transmission capacity increases, as long as a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported.
Consequently, the cheapgen has positive incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported. ■ By comparing (6) and (11), we may conclude that the magnitude of the change in the equilibrium cheapgen's profit due to an incremental transmission expansion (i.e., This monotonicity is based on the rationale that, the more generation firms internalize the congestion rents, the higher the congestion rents are due to the firms' ability to influence nodal prices. As the fraction of FTRs that the cheapgen holds increases, the cheapgen is more likely to sacrifice some profits it would otherwise earn from supplying energy in order to increase the profits it receives in the form of dividends on the FTRs it holds. Accordingly, while the P/A Nash equilibrium is supported, the larger α, the stronger the cheapgen's incentive to increase its production (and, in this way, decrease the price at node 1, for the benefit of the consumers located at node 1) in order to raise its equilibrium profit.
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Proposition 4: In the two-node network described in this section, assume that a P/A Nash equilibrium is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. Moreover, assume generation firms can hold FTRs. Thus, (11), we obtain that:
From (12), and the fact that 2 P > 1 P must hold in order to still support a P/A Nash equilibrium, we conclude that
The previous propositions assume that FTRs are allocated free of charge directly to the generation firms. If generation firms must acquire their FTRs through some type of auction, the auctioneer could sell the FTRs created by a transmission expansion to the cheapgen up to a price such that the extra expenditure incurred to acquire the FTRs equals the difference in the cheapgen's profit between before and after the expansion. In such a case, and assuming that an increase in the transmission capacity would increase both the total consumer surplus and the social welfare (Sheffrin, 2005) , it would be possible to leave the cheapgen revenue neutral and, at the same time, improve both consumer surplus and social welfare. This would mean that we could use this type of incentives as an instrument to induce incremental transmission expansions that are social-welfare improving. Proposition 5 summarizes this result.
Proposition 5:
In the two-node network described in this section, assume that a P/A Nash equilibrium is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. Assume also that generation firms can hold FTRs.
Moreover, assume that an increase in the transmission capacity would increase both consumer surplus and social welfare. Thus, if all FTRs were auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm, then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral.
Proof. Assume generation firms can hold FTRs, which must be acquired through some type of auction. Suppose that an incremental transmission expansion is desired in the described twonode network because it increases both consumer surplus and social welfare, as it is more likely to happen in a congested radial network according to the gains from trade economic principle (Sheffrin, 2005) . Then, an auctioneer could sell the FTRs created by the transmission expansion to the cheapgen for a price such that the extra expenditure incurred to acquire the FTRs equals the difference in the cheapgen's profit between before and after the expansion (proposition 3 ensures that the cheapgen's profit increases within this expansion). Then, proposition 5 is true by construction, which implies that this type of incentives can be used as an instrument to induce "desired" incremental transmission expansions, leaving the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral. ■
On the other hand, while a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported, the deargen maximizes its profit as if it had monopoly power over its K-leftward-shifted inverse demand function, but having now also two revenues streams: a first stream of revenue from energy sales and a second revenue stream from the congestion rents. As the fraction of FTRs that the deargen holds increases, the deargen is more likely to sacrifice some profits it would otherwise earn from supplying energy in order to increase the profits it receives in the form of dividends on the FTRs it holds. Accordingly, while the P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the smaller α, the stronger the deargen's incentives to decrease its production and, in this way, increase the price at node 2. Consequently, while the P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the deargen effectively reduces the price elasticity of its residual demand curve and increases its local market power by holding FTRs.
Proposition 6 states a similar result as in proposition 2 in the case that generation firms can hold FTRs. In this case, the deargen's incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity are uncertain.
Proposition 6:Assume generation firms can hold FTRs. In the two-node network described in this section, while a P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the incentives that the net importer generation firm (i.e., the deargen) has to support an increase in the transmission capacity are ambiguous.
Proof. Assume generation firms can hold FTRs. Suppose that the cheapgen and the deargen hold fractions α and (1 -α) of the K FTRs available from node 1 to node 2 (α ∈ [0,1]), respectively.
Assume that a Nash equilibrium characterized by (q 1 c (α),q 2 c (α)), with q 1 c (α)>0 and q 2 c (α)>0, is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. The profit of the deargen at the equilibrium is:
Since q 2 c (α) > 0 and the inverse demand functions are continuous and downward sloping (i.e., P 2 '(q 2 c (α)+K) < 0), the first term of the right-hand side of (14) is negative. However, the second term must be positive, even though 1 P > P 1 (q 1 c (α)-K) and 2 P < P 2 (q 2 c (α)+K), because it must hold that 2 P > 1 P in order to still support a P/A Nash equilibrium. Consequently, according to (14), we cannot guarantee the sign of ( )
. This sign will be negative if the energy-sales revenue stream is stronger than the revenue stream from the congestion rents and positive in the opposite case. Thus, while a P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the incentives that the deargen has to support an increase in the transmission capacity are ambiguous. ■ Additionally, as we did in the case of the cheapgen, we can use (14) to argue about the monotonicity of *
with respect to α. This result is summarized in proposition 7.
Proposition 7:
In the two-node network described in this section, assume that a P/A Nash equilibrium is achieved and that a P/A Nash equilibrium is still supported when making an incremental transmission investment. Moreover, assume generation firms can hold FTRs. Thus,
is decreasing in α. (14), we obtain that:
( 1 5 ) From (15), and the fact that 2 P > 1 P must hold in order to still support a P/A Nash equilibrium, we conclude that
is decreasing in α. ■ Proposition 6 says that we cannot guarantee that the deargen's profit increases when an incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansion occurs and, thus, we cannot guarantee that the deargen has the correct incentives to support such an expansion. Furthermore, proposition 7 tells us that, even if deargen has the right incentives to support an incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansion, those incentives would decrease as more FTRs are allocated to the cheapgen (i.e., as α increases). Consequently, a socially-concerned regulator should restrict the ownership of FTRs by the net importer generation firm because that may produce a disincentive to support incremental transmission expansions that increase both consumer surplus and social welfare.
Finally, we like to reiterate, that the analysis in this-section is only valid for sufficiently small transmission upgrades such that the transmission line capacity does not exceed K'. However, the value of K' increases as α increases. Thus, under this second scenario, both generation firms will support a P/A Nash equilibrium up to a line capacity that not only exceeds the benchmark case threshold, but is even larger as more FTRs are allocated to the cheapgen.
Numerical Example
In this section, we use the same numerical example employed in section 2 to illustrate the previous-section findings about the incentives that generation firms have to support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansions under both scenarios: with and without FTRs. This is, under both scenarios, we assume that the inverse demand functions are given by P 1 (q) = 100 -0.1⋅q at node 1 and P 2 (q) = 120 -0.2⋅q at node 2 (in $/MWh) and that the marginal costs of generation are zero for the cheapgen and $20/MWh for the deargen. We also assume now that there is a transmission line connecting both nodes.
Scenario I: generation firms cannot hold transmission rights
If the capacity of the line linking both nodes were very high, then the transmission capacity constraint would not be binding and the firms would compete as Cournot duopolists in the combined market. In such a case, at the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, the cheapgen would hourly produce 633 MWh while the deargen would hourly generate 333 MWh and the market-clearing price would be $42.2/MWh at both nodes.
The smallest transmission capacity that can support an unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium, K*, is approximately equal to 115 MW in this numerical example. 20 With K = K*, the 20 We computed K* as follows. The deargen's profit, when a line of capacity K is congested into its market, is given by . Consequently, the line capacity that makes the deargen indifferent between producing its unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium output, q 2 UCDE , and producing its deargen is indifferent between producing its unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium hourly output (i.e., 333 MWh) and producing its optimal passive response (i.e., 193 MWh), given that the cheapgen is producing 633 MWh (i.e., its unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium hourly output).
At any larger K, each generation firm would strictly prefer the unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium outcome to its optimal passive output response when the other firm produces its unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantity.
For a transmission line of capacity slightly less than K*, K = 110 MW for instance, the unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium is not attainable; the deargen would (just barely) prefer to produce the optimal passive output than play its Cournot best response to the cheapgen producing its Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantity. But if the deargen produced its optimal passive output (i.e., 195 MWh), then the cheapgen would revert to sell its profit-maximizing quantity that congest the transmission line (i.e., 555 MWh). This amount is smaller than the cheapgen's NashCournot equilibrium quantity (i.e., 633 MWh). As the cheapgen reduces its output, producing its optimal passive output becomes less attractive to the deargen. If that were the case, then the deargen would jump to produce its Cournot best response to 555 MWh, which is 373 MWh. With the line uncongested, however, the cheapgen would then respond with its Cournot best response of 614 MWh, and the process would once again iterate toward the unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium. However, because the line capacity is just slightly below the level that can support the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, as the cheapgen's output approaches its Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantity (i.e., 633 MWh), and strictly before it equals that quantity, the deargen will once again revert to produce its optimal passive output. Consequently, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this case. This situation will occur for any line capacity between K' and K*.
optimal passive output, q 2 c *, given that the cheapgen is producing its unconstrained Nash-Cournot duopoly equilibrium output, must satisfy the condition π 2 (q 2 UCDE ) = π 2 (q 2 c *), or equivalently, 7,407 = 0.05⋅(500 -K*) 2 . Thus, K* = 500 -( )
The largest line capacity that can support a P/A Nash equilibrium, K', is approximately equal to 53.6 MW in this numerical example. 21 With K = K', the deargen is indifferent between producing its Cournot best response to the cheapgen's aggressive output and producing its optimal passive output. At any smaller K, each generation firm would strictly prefer the P/A Nash equilibrium outcome to its Cournot best response when the other firm produces its P/A Nash equilibrium quantity.
Summarizing, for a line of capacity smaller than 53.6 MW (i.e., for K such that 0 < K < K'), the P/A Nash equilibrium characterized by q 1 c = 5⋅(100 + 0.1⋅K) and q 2 c = 2.5⋅(100 -0.2⋅K) exists and is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; for a line of capacity between 53.6 MW and 115 MW (i.e., K' < K < K*), no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists; and for a line of capacity higher than 115 MW (i.e., K* < K), the unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium characterized by q 1 UCDE = 633 MWh and q 2 UCDE = 333 MWh is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 21 To compute K', we proceed as follows. The cheapgen's profit, when a line of capacity K is congested from its market, is given by If the capacity of the transmission line were increased by a large-enough amount such that it became greater than K*, then the transmission capacity constraint would not be binding and the firms would compete as Cournot duopolists in the combined market. As result of that, the cheapgen would earn a profit of $26,741/h and the deargen would earn a profit of $7,407/h, as previously mentioned, which would result in a reduction in profits for both generation firms as compared to the pre-expansion situation. Consequently, neither the cheapgen nor the deargen have incentive to support such an investment, although it may improve social welfare (from $56,531/h to $65,963/h, without considering any investment cost).
On the other hand, if the thermal capacity of the transmission line were slightly increased from 50 MW to 52 MW (note that 52 MW < K'), then the resulting equilibrium would be the one showed in the second column of Table 2 . Comparing the results obtained when K = 50 MW and when K = 52 MW, we verify that, as the transmission capacity increases from 50 MW to 52 MW: (i) the cheapgen increases its output at the equilibrium, (ii) the equilibrium price at node 1 increases, (iii) the cheapgen's profit increases (which confirms the cheapgen's incentives to support this transmission expansion), (iv) the deargen reduces its output at the equilibrium, (v) the equilibrium price at node 2 decreases, (vi) the deargen's profit decreases (which confirms the deargen's disincentives to support this transmission expansion), and (vii) social welfare increases.
Consequently, these results verify that, while a P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, the cheapgen has incentives to support an increase in the capacity of the transmission line while the deargen has disincentives to support such an expansion. As mentioned before, this conclusion is only valid for upgrades that increase the capacity of the line up to K'.
Scenario II: generation firms can hold FTRs
Now, we assume that all FTRs are allocated free of charge to the generation firms. For illustrative purposes, suppose that the cheapgen holds 80% of the available FTRs and the deargen holds the remaining 20% (i.e., α = 0.8). In this case, Table 3 presents the resulting equilibria when the transmission capacity is 50 MW and when it is 52 MW. By comparing Table 2 and Table 3 , we observe that, by holding some FTRs, both generation firms increase their profits with respect to the benchmark case. Furthermore, we notice that, when holding FTRs, the cheapgen has incentives to increase its production (and, in this way, to decrease its nodal price) while the deargen has incentives to decrease its production (and, in this way, to increase its nodal price) in order to increase their revenues from congestion rents, as we predicted in the previous section.
As in the benchmark case, by comparing the two columns of Table 3 , we observe that the cheapgen has positive incentives to support an increase from 50 MW to 52 MW in the transmission capacity while the deargen has disincentives to support such an expansion.
Moreover, by comparing Table 2 and Table 3 , we note that the magnitude of the change in the equilibrium cheapgen's profit due to the incremental transmission expansion is greater in the case where the cheapgen can hold FTRs (and, in fact, it is increasing in α, as showed in Figure 4 ). This result suggests that, while the P/A Nash equilibrium prevails, it would be more likely that the cheapgen supports an incremental social-welfare-improving transmission expansion when it holds FTRs than when it does not hold FTRs.
By varying the values of α, it is straightforward to verify both that the larger α, the stronger the cheapgen's incentive to increase its production (and, in this way, to decrease its nodal price).
Furthermore, the larger α, the weaker the deargen's incentive to reduce its production (and, in this way, to raise its nodal price). Accordingly, when the cheapgen holds all the available FTRs, the consumers located at node 1 benefit the most from the nodal price reduction while the surplus of the consumers located at node 2 remains at the benchmark's level (because the deargen has no extra incentive to reduce its production and, thus, increase its nodal price when α = 1).
Consequently, the value of α that maximizes both consumer surplus and social welfare is α = 1, as it is evident in Figure 4 . 22 Figure 4 shows the evolution of several equilibrium quantities, as α increases, when K = 50 MW. In Figure 4 , Δπ 1 * corresponds to the magnitude of the change in the equilibrium cheapgen's profit due to an incremental transmission expansion from 50MW to 52 MW; Δπ 2 * is the magnitude of the change in the equilibrium deargen's profit due to an incremental transmission expansion from 50 MW to 52 MW; CS * is the equilibrium total consumer surplus (K = 50 MW); and W * represents the equilibrium social welfare (K = 50 MW). In this figure, we verify both that Δπ 1 * is increasing in α, as proposition 4 states, and that Δπ 2 * is decreasing in α , as stated in proposition 7. Using a procedure similar to the one followed in the benchmark case, we can compute the largest line capacity that can support a P/A Nash equilibrium, K', for different values of α. By varying the values of α, it is easy to verify that K' increases as α increases. For instance, with α = 0.8, we obtain K' = 90 MW and, with α = 0.5, we obtain K' = 88 MW. Consequently, as more
FTRs are allocated to the cheapgen, both generation firms will support a P/A Nash equilibrium up to a larger transmission line capacity.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed how the exercise of local market power by generation firms alters the firms' incentives to support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission investments in the context of a two-node network. We explored how such incentives are affected by the ownership structure of FTRs and how the FTRs' allocation may be used to both align the incentives for incremental transmission expansion of the different market participants and mitigate conflicts of interest when such expansions are socially beneficial.
Our analysis showed that, in the two-node network described, the net exporter generation firm (i.e., the cheapgen) has positive incentives to support an increase in the transmission capacity up to any level so that a passive/aggressive Nash equilibrium is still supported. We also proved that the magnitude of the change in the equilibrium cheapgen's profit due to an incremental transmission expansion is increasing in the amount of FTRs that are allocated to the cheapgen. Moreover, we
showed that, if all FTRs were allocated or auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm, then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral.
